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CONSCIOUSNESS MAKES A DIFFERENCE:
A RELUCTANT DUALIST’S CONFESSION 
To Robert Jahn and Brenda Dunne
Introduction: Advancing the Mind-Body Problem into the Realm 
of Science
If something odd persists, would its mere persistence make it natural? 
That would be the case with the layperson, but the scientist and 
philosopher should know better. Commonness should never mislead us 
to get used to the incredible. 
Such is the phenomenon known as “consciousness,” underlying the 
age-old “Mind-Body Problem.” That consciousness exists at all is as odd 
today as it has been in ancient times. But here too, familiarity breeds 
contempt; the presence of consciousness at every moment in our waking 
lives often makes us forget how incredible it is. 
For more than two millennia, the study of this problem (Block et al., 
1997) has made no scientific progress. Physicalism,1 dualism, and all 
other isms keep debating on it without being able to propose any 
decisive argument, not to mention experimental test, which could 
conclude the debate in favor of one theory or another. 
But is this stalemate inevitable? I believe I have a scientific argument 
(Elitzur, 1989, 1996) in favor of one of the rival parties. Unfortunately, 
this party is interactionist dualism, which I dislike most. Indeed my 
argument comes with the expected penalty on this option, namely, 
entailing violation of a very basic physical principle. Being a physicist, 
this violation upsets me most.
Yet the argument is scientific, in that it derives, from a philosophical 
statements, an empirical prediction via the following reasoning:
1. By physicalism, consciousness and brain processes are identical.
2. Whence, then, the dualistic bafflement about their apparent 
nonidentity?
3. By physicalism, this nonidentity, and hence the resultant 
bafflement, must be due to error.
    
4. But then, again by physicalism, an error must have a causal 
explanation.
5. Logic, cognitive science and AI are advanced enough nowadays 
to provide such an explanation for the alleged error underlying 
dualism, and future neurophysiology must be able to point out its 
neural correlate. 
This prediction, if rigorous, is falsifiable and therefore turns both 
physicalism and dualism into scientific theories in the full Popperian 
sense. Now, can this prediction further be falsified? I believe it can, even 
before the above disciplines respond to the challenge. This can be done 
with the aid of another powerful scientific procedure, namely, thought-
experiment (Brown, 2007). Employing this procedure, I will show that no 
logical, cognitive or neural failure can produce the brain-consciousness 
nonidentity and the resulting bafflement as expressed by many humans. 
Ergo, bafflement about consciousness is a case where consciousness, as 
nonidentical with brain processes, exerts a causal effect of its own. 
This paper’s outline is as follows. In sections 1-3 I give an exposition 
of the Mind-Body Problem, with emphasis on what I believe to be the 
heart of the problem, namely, the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity and its 
incompatibility with the Physical Closure Paradigm. In 4 I present the 
“Qualia Inaction Postulate” underlying all non-interactionist theories 
that seek to resolve the above problem. Against this convenient 
postulate I propose in section 5 the “Bafflement Argument,” which is 
this paper's main thesis. Sections 6-11 critically discuss attempts to 
dismiss the Bafflement Argument by the “Bafflement=Misperception 
Equation.” Section 12 offers a refutation of all such attempts in the 
form of a concise “Asymmetry Proof.” Section 13 points out the bearing 
of the Bafflement Argument on the evolutionary role of consciousness
while section 14 acknowledges the price that has to be paid for it in 
terms of basic physical principles. Section 15 summarizes the paper, 
pointing out the inescapability of interactionist dualism. 
The scheme in Figure 1 gives this outline visually.
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1. What’s Your Mind-Body Problem Anyway?
Often, stating a problem well is half the way to its solution. Equally 
often, the Mind-Body Problem is ill-stated. Chalmers (1996), with typical 
wit, has shown that, when an author claims to have “solved” the Mind-
Body Problem, they probably do not understand it in the first place. 
Chalmers then introduced his by-now classic distinction between the 
“hard problem” and the “easy problems” of consciousness. The “hard 
problem” is the one discussed below, whereas “easy problems” are 
How does the brain process environmental stimulation? How does it in-
tegrate information? How do we produce reports on internal states? These 
are important questions, but to answer them is not to solve the hard 
problem: Why is all this processing accompanied by an experienced inner 
life? (pp. xi-xii). 
Let us, then, present the “hard problem” first, so as to provide a basis 
for the arguments to come. I shall invoke a naïve discussant whose 
questions will help us focus on the crucial issues.
So what’s the Mind-Body Problem with you anyway? Why don’t you 
believe that science gives a satisfactory explanation of consciousness?
When dealing with consciousness, science miserably fails in what has 
always been its hallmark of success, namely, reducing qualities to quantities.
“The qualitative” said Lord Rutherford, “is nothing but poor 
quantitative.” This, indeed, is usually the case. Consider, e.g., the 
following statements: 
1. Red differs from blue.
2. Sweet differs from salty.
3. Love differs from hate. 
These differences seem to be qualitative, but the scientific account 
neatly converts them into different numeric values on the same scales: 
1. Both red and blue light are electromagnetic waves, differing only in 
their wavelengths: 700 nm for red and 400 nm for blue. Conse-
quently, different cones in our retina react differently to these 
wavelengths due to different amino-acid sequences of their 
rhodopsin.
2. A sugar molecule, C6H12O6, contains carbon, hydrogen and oxygen 
atoms, while a salt molecule, NaCl, contains sodium and chlorine 
atoms. All these atoms contain identical electrons on their shells, 
differing only in their numbers, which they exchange with the 
molecules in our tongue receptors.
    
3. Both love and hate involve very similar neurons, differing mainly in 
their location and spatial arrangement (location, specified by 
geometry, is also a quantitative measure).
In all these examples, qualitative differences between percepts turn 
out to be basically quantitative.
Thanks! I’ll remember that next time I eat ice cream or hate someone. So 
why aren’t you satisfied with the physical explanations to conscious 
experience?
While these explanations do a good job with percepts, rendering them 
(through neuroscience and chemistry) physical events, some intriguing 
phenomena that accompany these percepts are left out. These are pure 
qualities, qualia. 
What’s that? And what's the difference between qualia and percepts? 
Qualia (“quale” in singular) are those aspects of our experience that 
cannot be communicated yet we know they are there. Suppose you and I 
look at a rose. Having verified that our color vision and linguistic 
abilities are normal, we assure each other that we both see a red rose. 
Still, you cannot rule out the possibility that I experience red the way you 
experience blue. True, in all languages each of us would name all colors 
the same way as the other. But this only means that we both have 
correctly learned to associate the appropriate word to the wavelength in 
question. Nothing of all that can tell you anything about my quale of the 
color. This is the notorious “inverted qualia problem.”
The same holds for all other percepts of sound, smell, etc. The 
percept itself can be accurately communicated, but the accompanying 
quale remains inaccessible. 
So, it’s merely a problem of communication.
Much worse. Qualia elude not only communication, but observation 
and experiment as well. Suppose that, with sufficiently advanced 
technology, you obtain the fullest real-time description of what goes on 
in my brain – every neuron, synapse and neurotransmitter molecule –
when I see a red rose. We have thus broadened the meaning of 
“percept” to the entire neurophysiological process that occurs when the 
stimulus is processed in the brain. Paradoxically, the problem now 
becomes worse:2 You know better than I do what goes on in my brain when I 
perceive red, and yet, that doesn't bring you any closer to my quale of red.
Worse still, it is not only that you cannot be sure that my qualia are 
similar to yours – you cannot even be sure that I have any qualia at all. 
    
With today’s technology, a machine is perfectly conceivable that will 
name colors, in any language, with much greater accuracy than all 
humans. Does such a machine have the qualia of “red” or “blue”? 
Returning to humans, the above “inverted qualia problem” leads to 
the even more grotesque “absent qualia problem,” also known as “the 
problem of other minds.” Personally I have no doubt that you, apart 
from appropriately responding to colors, sounds, tastes and odors, also 
experience their accompanying qualia. I am likewise sure that you feel 
happy when you laugh, besides the physical manifestation of laughter;
that you are sad when crying, etc. And yet, even this very reasonable 
intuitive belief has no rigorous proof. 
Isn’t there a law that obliges qualia to come with percepts?
No, just as there is no law obliging qualia to come with 
thunderstorms or soap bubbles. Moreover, once you assume that the 
brain operates in compliance with physical law, qualia must not play any role 
in the brain’s operation. 
Here is why. Consider first the motions of billiard balls. Must you 
invoke any quale in order to explain them? Should you hypothesize that 
the balls “feel repulsion” upon colliding, or “yearn” to come to rest 
when slowing down? Their behavior is strictly and solely governed by 
the laws of mechanics. Next consider a plant that has not been watered 
for several days, nearly dying. You water it, and soon its leaves stretch 
again and regain their vitality. Should you invoke the qualia of “thirst” or 
“slaking thirst” to explain what happened? The physical laws governing 
osmosis (different concentrations of salt on the two sides of the cell’s 
semi-permeable membrane) perfectly suffice. 
You can guess where I am heading. Much higher up the scale of 
complexity, above balls and plants, are humans. Their percepts, no 
matter how complex, are supposed to be governed by neuronal 
processes that are, in essence, physical. Now you want to explain a 
certain behavior, say, picking a red rose. If your explanation invokes not 
only the percept of red but the accompanying quale as well, this amounts 
to asserting that the laws of physics do not sufficiently account for a 
physical process. 
Why would that be so bad?
Well, if a non-physical cause plays a role in any process, than some of 
physics’ most revered laws, such as energy and momentum con-
servation, are violated. It is easy to understand it in the case of the balls: 
If anything other than mechanical forces is involved with their motions, 
    
then energy and momentum conservation must be violated. It would be 
much more difficult to prove such a violation with the plant drinking 
water, but the same violation must be involved in this case too. 
Now let’s return to the human picking a red rose. As long as only the 
percept of red affects her picking, then the accompanying quale plays no 
causal role and may be ignored. But if the quale too takes part, then the 
continuous, omnipresent causal network dominating physical reality 
must be somewhere broken. Somewhere along the neuronal chain, a 
physical event must occur that is not fully determined by the previous 
physical events. The very principle of causality is thereby violated.
But surely there is a difference between a few balls and a human! Our 
behavior is so complex…
Don't make the common error of letting qualia hide beneath 
complexity. The UN administration is many times more complex than 
each of its single officers. We may ascribe this administration various 
percepts – say, the UN “knows” and is even “concerned” about a war 
breaking – but it would be silly to ascribe the UN the quale of “concern” 
over such an event, even though a formal UN announcement may well 
express such concern. Complexity seems to be a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for qualia. Therefore it cannot explain why they exist. 
True, the fact that we know qualia only from complex organisms like 
us makes the problem more delicate. The situation brings to mind G. B. 
Shaw’s remark: “If you are not a communist at 20, you have no heart; if 
you are still a communist at 30, you have no head.” A similar choice 
awaits any self-consistent position with respect to qualia and levels of 
organization: Should you be silly or inhumane? If you grant qualia to, 
say, mice – believing that they have the quale of fear from cats, you may 
also ascribe the quale of “fear of light” to the photophobic response of a 
green alga, supposed to be accounted for by the automatic responses of 
its flagella.3 Or you may ascribe the quale of “fear of water” to a 
hydrophobic detergent molecule, supposed to be governed by electrical 
forces alone. On the other hand, if you deny the quale of fear of cats to 
mice, you may as well deny the quale of “fear of tigers” to a terrified 
Mogley running for his life.
Isn’t the percepts-qualia distinction similar to the hardware-software 
distinction? 
Certainly not! The shallow similarity between the two distinctions has 
misled many authors. Software, just like hardware, is a physical configu-
ration of matter. All humans have software in the form of a brain within 
    
which neurons are arranged and connected in special ways. Such a 
software is in principle observable to other persons. Furthermore, its 
existence is obliged by the laws of physics (biology, for this matter, being
physics too). Qualia, on the other hand, remain unobservable and alien 
to physical law.
The problem, then, seems to be related to the logical problems involved 
with self-observation.
Again, I strongly disagree. All kinds of self-reference are prominent 
properties of human mind, and surely very interesting ones, but there is 
nothing paradoxical to them. Any intelligent system must refer to itself, 
yet self-observation and self-knowledge may or may not be accompanied 
with qualia. The former are examples of the “easy problems” while the 
latter present the “hard problem.” It is qualia which are strange, not 
entailed by any physical law…
But you keep talking about “physics” as if present-day physics is the final 
word. Can’t you imagine that future physics will reveal new phenomena, 
say, some unknown properties of matter or energy, which will eventually 
account for qualia?
You don’t have to be conversant in physics, nor in any scientific 
discipline, in order to realize that no physical concept, whether known or still to 
be discovered, can account for qualia. Imagine attending a lecture by a distin-
guished physicist. You know that physicists ascribe to particles some 
properties to which they give fancy names like “beauty,” “charm,” etc. 
So this physicist has discovered a new property, “loveliness,” and argues 
that this property, inherent also to the particles within the brain, 
accounts for our qualia. A frightful mathematics follows, explaining 
what “loveliness” is and how it gives rise to qualia. Naturally, if you have 
not specialized in particle physics, no chance you will understand what 
she is talking about. Or imagine that the lecturer is a world-renowned 
neurophysiologist announcing the discovery of a new neurotransmitter, 
say, alpha-mindo-encephaline, that explains qualia. Here too, a highly 
technical description follows, showing the complex pattern of 
interactions of that molecule with specific receptors within the neuronal 
synapses. And here too, unless you are a neurophysiologist, you will 
understand nothing. 
Yet in both cases, if you look around in the audience, you will see 
senior scientists pensively nodding, perhaps raising some sophisticated 
objections, but finally saying, “Well, it’s interesting. Let’s think about it.” 
    
Don’t bother! Just ask, a priori: Can loveliness or alpha-whatever 
assure me, in principle, that my quale of red is not like your quale of 
blue? Worse, can it prove that any human has any qualia at all? Can any 
property of matter or energy rule out the possibility that my fellow 
humans lacks qualia altogether? You see, this is not a question of more 
knowledge.4 Qualia lie, in principle, beyond any possible physical account. 
So why not ignore qualia altogether?
Well, let’s see how long you can. Think about sleepwalking. Ridgway 
(1996) discusses in detail some cases where people committed murder 
while allegedly asleep, raising the question whether they can be held 
accountable for their deeds. Murder is an act requiring fairly advanced 
cognitive faculties, and yet, the people in these cases are believed to have 
been totally unaware of their own actions. Wilkes (1984) refers to a less 
substantiated case of a somnambulist physician who performed a 
medical examination and even made a correct diagnosis – all while 
asleep. In principle, there is no reason why this state cannot be extended 
to all mental functions. One might laugh, cry, – even converse! – while 
totally unconscious. For this reason, Wilkes titled her article “Is 
consciousness important?” Her answer being, expectedly, “No.”
Is she correct? Here is a thought experiment for you: How about 
turning all your qualia off, thereby putting you to permanent 
sleepwalking? All your percepts will remain the same, hence all your 
actions will be the same too. No one, therefore, would ever notice any 
difference in your behavior. But your qualia would be gone, forever. For 
doing this experiment on you, you will be paid $1,000,000. Would you 
agree?
But it is doubtful whether it is possible to accurately… 
Never mind technicalities! In physics, a gedankenexperiment (thought-
experiment) is an indispensable tool, enabling one to anticipate 
technology by many years. Just bear in mind that physics allows the 
existence of humans with no qualia at all; and moreover that such 
humans are more compatible with physics than we conscious humans
(see the discussion on zombies in Section 9 below). So, again, would you 
agree, for that nice sum, to go into lifelong sleepwalking which will leave 
your observed behavior intact but turn off your qualia of red and blue, 
sorrow and joy, forever? 
Well, others won’t see any difference, but for me it would be nothing short 
of death. 
    
Welcome to the Mind-Body Problem! Science deals only with 
percepts, but it is qualia, which accompany every percept, that are the 
most essential ingredients of our life. Yet, they have no place even in the 
fullest and most detailed scientific explanation. 
The Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity can be summarized as follows. 
A Percept A Quale
is a state occurring within one’s 
brain upon perceiving something,
is the experience accompanying the 
percept,
obliged by physical law and 
evolving in strict compliance with 
it,
not entailed by physical law, 
and can, in principle, be observed 
by another person, communicated 
and quantitatively measured with 
any desired accuracy.
and cannot, even in principle, be 
observed by another person, 
communicated or measured
Consciousness, then, is the totality of our qualia. Why is there 
consciousness at all, and how it is related to the brain, is the Mind-Body 
Problem. 
2. No Room for Qualia: The Physical Closure Paradigm 
But what is it that makes physics so inhospitable to consciousness? 
Among the most important pillars of physical law, and hence of all natu-
ral and life sciences, is a set of conservation laws, such as conservation 
of mass, energy, momentum and charge. It is due to these laws that 
some of the greatest scientific discoveries have been made. Conservation 
laws portray the universe as a closed system within which no mass, en-
ergy, etc. is ever added or subtracted. For this reason, every time some 
conserved quantity appears not to be conserved, a discovery may be on 
the way: Either a new phenomenon is to be revealed, or an important 
law is to be modified. This is the famous “closure of the physical 
world.” Nothing other than physical phenomena – matter, energy, fields
and their properties – takes place in the universal web of causes and 
effects. Because this assumption is so fundamental, underlying all natural 
and life sciences, I refer to it as not only a theory but rather as a 
paradigm. 
Consider, then, a person responding to a stimulus. Anything other 
than physical causes affecting her response must lead to a violation of 
one of the conservation laws. Now, as that person also experiences
    
some qualia during the process, then, assuming the Percepts-Qualia 
Nonidentity, any causal role played by qualia is not only redundant but
forbidden.
3. The Dilemma: Dismiss Qualia or Accept Violation of Physical 
Law
Between the Scylle of the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity and the Charybdis
of The Physical Closure Paradigm, lies the entire strait of the Mind-Body 
Problem. And there are Sirens too, in the form of several theories 
offering their solutions. They can be grouped into two major types, 
namely, physicalism and dualism.5 Physicalism invented a variety of 
exercises in order to prove that qualia do not really exist, being merely 
some aspects of the percepts (Dennett, 1991, 2003). Dualism, on the 
other hand, straightforwardly acknowledged that qualia exist alongside 
percepts.
Physicalism never won the full acceptance of the scientific and 
philosophical communities. If there is something to “red” that I cannot 
communicate and that even the most detailed description of my brain 
cannot yield – then something probably exists that lies outside of the 
framework of present-day science. Now these qualia, for any person, are 
by no means trivial: To lack them is to be inwardly dead. It would 
therefore be silly to ignore their existence.
While dualism does not dismiss qualia, the cure that it offers seems to 
be worse than the disease. It flies, as shown in the previous section, in
the face of the Physical Closure Paradigm. 
Understandably, some people turned to parapsychology in search of a 
straightforward proof that something non-physical interferes with 
behavior. Most notable were the Princeton Engineering Anomalies 
Research Laboratory (Jahn & Dunne, 1987, 2001). Yet, so far, after 
many years of admirable labor, the effects they found have not been 
strong enough to convince the scientific community. 
Others turned to quantum mechanics for help. QM, so it seems, has 
undermined determinism, hence an interference of qualia with the 
brain’s random macroscopic events may not violate physical law after all. 
Thus Eccles (1994) has invoked QM to allow free will to interfere with 
the neurons’ synapses without violating energy conservation. Other 
quantum-mechanical models were proposed by eminent physicists (e.g., 
Penrose, 1994; Stapp, 2009; Tuszynski, 2006). Although being ingenious, 
they do not purport to resolve the “hard problem” (see the proverbial 
particle physicist in Section 1), but only argue that the action of 
    
consciousness can preserve energy conservation, in compliance with the 
first law of thermodynamics.
The trouble, however, is that there is also a second law of 
thermodynamics, dealing with entropy increase. One of this law’s 
derivatives, associated with the famous “Maxwell’s demon” paradox 
(Fanchon et al., 2009), says that it is impossible to introduce order into a 
disordered process without investing energy. This leaves dualism with 
two options. Either 
a. Qualia’s effect on behavior is random. That won’t help much. To affect 
behavior, qualia must do so consistently. For example, if the quale of 
red, in addition to the percept, affects one’s picking a red rose, then 
that quale must work the same way every time the percept appears. 
Or
b. Qualia’s effect is systematic. But then, qualia must be using energy in or-
der to interfere with the brain’s random processes in a nonrandom 
manner, again violating the first and/or the second laws of 
thermodynamics.
To summarize, physicalism advises us to believe that qualia do not 
really exist, while dualism acknowledges their existence at the price of 
allowing physical anomalies. 
4. The Consensual Compromise: The Qualia Inaction Postulate
So, is physicalism or dualism offering the lesser evil? To better address 
this question, we should consider a few variants/hybrids of these rival 
schools: 
a. Identity/double-aspect theory: The quale and the percept are one and the 
same process, only perceived as different.
b. Parallelism: The quale and the percept are different processes, be-
longing to the mental and the physical realms, respectively. In each 
realm, events follow one another in a strict cause-and-effect manner. 
However, the two realms run parallel, never interfering with one 
another. Only by virtue of their perfect correlation they give rise to 
the illusion that they causally affect one another.
c. Epiphenomenalism: The quale and the percept are different processes,
belonging to the mental and the physical realms, respectively. But 
they maintain asymmetric causal relations: percepts give rise to qualia 
but never vice versa. 
    
Now, we do not need to go into the details of these theories, for they 
all share with physicalism one crucial postulate: Qualia play no causal role.
Let us examine this postulate with the aid of an ordinary behavior: A 
woman kisses a man. First consider the man-in-the-street explanation of 
this behavior: 
a. Alice kisses Bob because she loves him (common sense). 
The Mind-Body Problem arises with its full acuity: “Love” is both a 
percept and a quale. Which of them, then, constitutes the kiss’s cause? 
Let's first pursue the most daring option: 
b. Alice’s kissing Bob is caused by the quale of her love to him (In-
teractionist Dualism). 
No scientifically minded scholar would accept such an account, 
fearing the clash with the Physical Closure Paradigm. To avoid this, one 
might try:
c. Alice kisses Bob because the percept of love, caused by sensory signals 
coming from him, triggers the behavior of kissing (Physicalism).
But then where, in all this, is love’s quale? A prudent theorist might 
clarify this position as follows: 
d. Alice’s quale of loving is the percept of loving; she only perceives the 
two things as distinct (Identity or Double-Aspect Theory).
Or 
e. Alice has the quale of loving alongside with the percept. It is only the 
percept, being a physical event, which gives rise to the consequent 
physical act of kissing, while the accompanying quale gives rise only to 
consequent qualia (Parallelism).
Or 
f. Alice has the quale of loving alongside with the percept. It is only the 
percept, being a physical event, which gives rise to the consequent 
physical act of kissing, yet this percept, as well as all the consequent 
brain states, produce the accompanying qualia (Epiphenomenalism).
Options (e-f) are semi-dualist or noninteractionist-dualist theories. 
Their bottom line, shared with physicalism (c-d) as well, is this: For any 
instance where a quale seems to affect behavior, it can be shown that it 
is not the quale but its physical parallel, the percept, which exerts the 
effect. (Kim, 1996). 
    
This can be succinctly put as the Qualia Inaction Postulate:
Any behavior would be exactly the same have there been no qualia.
Little wonder that this postulate has been opted for by most modern 
philosophers.6 It acknowledges that something very peculiar is going on 
within us, yet assures us that this thing has no influence whatsoever on 
our observable behavior. Consciousness, then, should make no 
difference.
5. But Qualia Do Play a Causal Role: The Bafflement Argument
The stakes are now very high. We need only one example in which the 
Qualia Inaction Postulate fails – where a quale alone, in itself, not its 
parallel percept, exerts a causal effect – to falsify all the comfortable 
alternatives to interactionist dualism. Guess what: This example is 
occurring to you, dear reader, at this very moment! 
For, why do we feel and say that qualia are not identical with brain 
processes? Why do we talk, argue and write about the Mind-Body 
Problem? I submit that the answer is simply this: We are baffled by 
qualia because we have qualia. Hence, as against the Qualia Inaction 
Postulate, I propose the Bafflement Argument:
The fact that humans are baffled by the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity, and express 
this bafflement by their observable behavior, is a case where qualia per se – as 
nonidentical with percepts – play a causal role in a physical process. 
6. Let’s Explain it Away: The Bafflement=Misperception 
Equation
Of course, adherents of the Qualia-Inaction Postulate and the Physical 
Closure Paradigm will not let us get away with it so easily. Anticipating 
their objections will help us advance the problem further into the 
scientific realm.
“He who increases knowledge increases pain” (Ecclesiastes 1, 18), 
but the opposite is equally correct. Isn’t it significant, now that we come 
to think of it, that most discussions of qualia take a painful experience as 
a starting point? Happy experiences are taken for granted! So, for 
knowledge’s sake, let us inflict the following pain on our Alice. She and 
Bob have broken up, leaving Alice sad over the separation. Now Alice 
wonders: Why is there a quale of sadness? 
No matter how much neuroscience she studies, she only finds herself 
delving deeper into the Mind-Body Problem. in fact she has already 
found consolation in a new love, but the problem keeps baffling her, 
    
hence she talks, argues and attends conferences on it. She may even 
write a paper. 
Can we subject Alice’s bafflement to the same procedures to which 
we earlier subjected her act of kissing? The man-in-the-street account is, 
again, simple: 
a. Alice says that qualia are baffling because she experiences a quale that 
is nonidentical with her percept (Interactionist dualism). 
This, again, is anathema to the Qualia Inaction Postulate, and hence 
to the entire Physical Closure Paradigm. There seems to be only one way 
to avoid such a clash with physical law, namely, to prove that Alice's 
bafflement is misguided, and, moreover, that the Percepts-Qualia 
Nonidentity is false. Consider the less interesting case in which Alice 
believes in evil eye. Surely no one would ascribe this belief to the existence
of evil eye. Rather, we would ascribe it to an error, stemming from faulty 
reasoning. Why not, then, ascribe the bafflement about qualia to a 
similar error? Here, then, is the alternative:
b. Alice says that qualia are baffling because faulty reasoning misleads
her to believe that qualia are nonidentical with percepts (Physicalism). 
This position can be generalized to the Bafflement=Misperception 
Equation: 
Some people misperceive their own percepts, falsely believing that they are ac-
companied with nonidentical qualia, therefore expressing bafflement over this duality. 
7. Misperception Entails a Neural Failure: A Testable Prediction 
Derived from the Bafflement=Misperception Equation
Notice, first, that by this explanation-away the physicalist position 
commits itself, for the first time, to a falsifiable prediction: When future 
neurophysiology becomes advanced enough to point out the neural correlates of false 
beliefs, a specific correlate of this kind would be found to underlie the bafflement about 
qualia. Then, at long last, we shall understand why, for more than two 
millennia, numerous otherwise-intelligent authors misperceived their 
percepts, thereby being misled to believe in the Qualia-Percepts 
Nonidentity.7
I don’t believe any of this. But the point is that the question is not
matter of belief anymore. It has rather turned into an empirical issue. 
Conversely, the Bafflement Argument entails the opposite prediction: 
No neural pattern underlying a false belief will be found to underlie adherence to 
dualism.
    
Happily, we don't have to wait for future science to rule in this mat-
ter. Simple logic suffices to show that those who ascribe dualism to mis-
perception commit an embarrassing error. 
8. The Crucial Issue: If the Bafflement=Misperception Equation
is Valid, the Mind-Body Problem is Over
It is now time to give the Bafflement=Misperception Equation its most 
due serious consideration: Is the expression of bafflement over qualia obliged by 
some physical laws governing our brains? Or, put in the AI language, Is there a 
physical/logical principle that obliges an intelligent system to express bafflement of this 
kind? I italicize these questions because they are of utmost importance; 
please bear with the didactic tone of my italicizing their significance too: 
If a proof is ever given that an intelligent system, by virtue of physical laws alone, 
must state that it has qualia which are nonidentical with percepts, then the age-old 
Mind-Body Problem would finally get a definite solution – a physicalist one. The 
Percept-Qualia Nonidentity would turn out to be nothing but an unfortunate misper-
ception, inherent to all intelligent systems, and the problem would turn out to be a 
pseudo-problem. 
Yes, it will be that simple: Just as there is no “rabbit-duck problem,” 
“left-right positioned Necker cube problem” or any other problem 
entailed by misperception, so would the Mind-Body Problem finally turn 
out to be the mere failure of many otherwise-intelligent people to realize 
that percepts and qualia are just one and the same thing. All dualistic ar-
guments made over the millennia – from Plato to Descartes to Leibniz 
to Popper and all others – would be put to rest by a simple and 
collective ad hominem, formulated in the precise terms of cognitive sci-
ence. Dennett will triumphantly say: “I told you so!” Philosophy and 
science would then move on – for good – to other issues. 
Now, the authors quoted in the following sections are alleging just 
such a proof, evidently without realizing that, if correct, this proof 
amounts to no less than The ultimate solution to the Mind-Body 
Problem. The only question is, Is this proof valid?
Don't hold your breath.
9. Chalmers: Zombies Misperceive Just as We Do
In his delightful The Conscious Mind (1996) Chalmers’ briefly objects to 
my Bafflement Argument:
Indeed, Elitzur (1989) argues directly from the existence of claims about 
consciousness to the conclusion that the laws of physics cannot be complete, 
and that consciousness plays an active role in directing physical processes (he 
    
suggests that the second law of thermodynamics might be false). But I have 
already argued that interactionist dualism is of little help in avoiding the 
problem of explanatory irrelevance (p. 183).
Chalmers has struggled with a similar idea in his discussion of 
“zombies.” These creatures are very instructive. Imagine intelligent 
beings that resemble us in every detail of our physiology, neuroanatomy 
and chemistry, but have no qualia.8 This, recall, is perfectly consistent with 
physics – in fact, as noted above, zombies accord with physics more than 
the existence of non-zombies. 
Our question now assumes a specific form: Would zombies be as baffled 
by qualia as humans are? 
Astonishingly, Chalmers’ answer is in the affirmative. His reasoning is 
so peculiar that I prefer to use lengthy quotes: 
To see the problem in a particularly vivid way, think of my zombie twin in 
the universe next door. He talks about conscious experience all the time – in 
fact, he seems obsessed by it. He spends ridiculous amounts of time hunched 
over a computer, writing chapter after chapter on the mysteries of sensory 
qualia, professing a particular love of deep greens and purples. He frequently 
gets into arguments with zombie physicalists, arguing that their position 
cannot do justice to the realities of conscious experience. 
And yet he has no conscious experience at all! In his universe, the physi-
calists are right and he is wrong. Most of his claims about conscious ex-
perience are utterly false. But there is certainly a physical or functional 
explanation of why he makes the claims he makes. After all, his universe is 
fully law-governed, and no events therein are miraculous, so there must be 
some explanation of his claims. But such explanations must ultimately be in 
terms of physical processes and laws, for these are the only processes and 
laws in his universe (p. 180).
Absurdity culminates with the conclusion:
The explanation of his claims obviously does not depend on the existence of 
consciousness, as there is no consciousness in his world. It follows that the 
explanation of my claims is also independent of the existence of 
consciousness (p. 180).
One has to read this passage time and again in order to believe what 
it says: A philosopher writes a book about qualia, discussing their enigmatic nature 
in great detail, and then states that he would write exactly the same book had he 
lacked qualia!9
But why on Earth should zombies express bafflement about qualia if 
they don’t have any? After all, Chalmers professes physicalism, by which 
there is a cause for anything zombies say. If the cause of the talk about 
qualia is not qualia themselves, what is it? As he himself frankly asks, 
    
To get some feel for the situation, imagine that we have created compu-
tational intelligence in the form of an autonomous agent that perceives its 
environment and has the capacity to reflect rationally on what it perceives. 
What would such a system be like? Would it have any concept of 
consciousness, or any related notions?
His answer is “yes,” reasoning, in essence, that the zombie misperceives
his “direct, unmediated” percept as distinct from what he knows about 
that percept: 
[I]t seems likely that such a system would have the same kind of attitude 
toward its perceptual contents as we do toward ours, with its knowledge of 
them being direct and unmediated, at least as far as the system is concerned. 
When we ask how it knows that it sees the red tricycle, an efficiently 
designed system would say, “I just see it!” When we ask how it knows that the 
tricycle is red, it would say the same sort of thing that we would do: “It just 
looks red.” If such a system were reflective, it might start wondering about 
how is it that things look red, and about why it is that red just is a particular 
way, and blue another. From the system’s point of view it is just a brute fact 
that red looks one way, and blue another. Of course from our vantage point
we know that this is just because red throws the system into one state, and 
blue throws it into another; but from the machine’s point of view this does 
not help (p. 185). 
Let us summarize this reasoning: 
1. People have qualia. 
2. People express bafflement about qualia. 
3. Physics allows the existence of zombies that lack qualia. 
4. Zombies must also express bafflement about qualia. 
5. Therefore people express bafflement about qualia for reasons  
other than their having qualia. 
Chalmers is well aware (personal communication, July 2004) that this 
position is awkward. But the situation is worse. It is obvious that 
Chalmers’ zombie, by Chalmers’ own typology (see section 1 above), is 
addressing one the “easy problems” while the real Chalmers addresses 
the “hard problem.” This gives rise to a clear asymmetry: Just ask 
yourself: Can a zombie brood over the “problem of absent immediate 
perceptions” as we brood over the “problem of absent qualia”? By 
Chalmers’ own account, the answer is negative! This asymmetry will 
shortly enable us to prove that the Bafflement=Misperception Equation 
is plainly wrong. 
    
10. Chalmers vs. Charmless: A Revised Turing Test 
Notice, first, that Chalmers phrased his Zombie Universe too loosely. 
He did not even consider the possibility that the zombie philosopher 
will not express bafflement. Indeed, there are two definitions for a 
phenomenal zombie, namely,
a. A human that behave exactly like an ordinary human but lacks qualia. 
b. A human that physically operates like an ordinary human but lacks 
qualia.
The difference is important. The first definition is opaque to physical 
reasoning, inevitably leading to the “zombie bafflement” mess discussed 
in the previous section. The second definition is more scientific in that it 
only specifies the system’s initial conditions and leaves the resulting state 
to be causally deduced from the former. Let us, therefore use the second
definition.
We are now in a position to propose an experiment that, though not 
yet feasible, may transfer the study of qualia from philosophy to 
empirical science. In essence, it is a variant of the celebrated Turing test 
(Turing 1950), designed for judging whether a sufficiently advanced 
computer can simulate human intelligence. With the proposed 
modification, this test can give a clear-cut answer to a much more 
fundamental question.
Turing’s test was this: Let a computer and a human dwell in two 
separate rooms. Let the experimenter, unaware of their locations, send 
whatever questions she has in mind to both rooms via electric cables 
and get their answers in the same way. If she fails to tell by the answers 
who is the machine and who is the human, then the machine, for all 
practical purposes, is as intelligent as a human. 
Suppose, now, that such a future computer has passed the test. The 
time is now ripe for the greatest question of all: Does this computer have 
qualia?
First, let us give our computer a name. How about Charmless? The 
slight difference from its human namesake indicates that, unless we 
prove that it has qualia, then, even if it is as bright and witty as 
Chalmers, it is Chalmers’ zombie incarnate. 
The test is straightforward – a seemingly innocuous question, say, 
“What is red?”
    
Assuming that we have followed Turing’s recommendation “to 
provide the machine with the best sense organs that money could buy” 
(Hodges, 1988), Charmless might give a very accurate answer, such as 
1. “Red is the color I perceive when electromagnetic radiation of wavelength 
700 nm impinges on the photoelectric device at the back of my obscure 
chamber, absorbed by photochemical molecules sensitive to this wavelength, 
and converted into electric pulses that go through optic fibers to the color-
recognition system that in turn activates my memory, language and vocal 
systems.” 
This answer is much more detailed and accurate than that of an av-
erage human. But it would indicate that Charmless is a zombie, indeed 
devoid of phenomenal charm.
On the other hand, the above answer might have a baffled 
addendum, such as
2. “Red is… [see 1 above]. However, there is something to my subjective 
experience of red that is not indicated by the description I just gave you. I 
know of no way of communicating that additional ingredient. Although I can 
see that you and I refer to the same color when we use the same word, I can 
never be sure whether your subjective experience of red is not what I 
experience as blue. In fact, I am not sure you have any subjective experience 
accompanying your color perception.” 
This, as with humans, would indicate that Charmless too has qualia in 
addition to his percepts. 
Notice that in this case we can determine with certainty the cause of 
this bafflement. Since Charmless is man-made, we can rule out the 
possibility that his bafflement is the result of some pre-installed “bug” 
such as an explicit command to express bafflement or some deliberate 
misperception imposed on it. In other words, we can rule out any cause 
to Charmless’ assertion about having qualia other than his really having 
them.
11. The Crucial Question Sharpened: Would Zombies be Baffled 
Too? 
Following Chalmers’ analysis, a heated debate ensued over the issue of 
zombies, particularly over the question whether they might be baffled 
over qualia. Moody (1994), contra Chalmers, argued that they would not. 
Several articles followed Moody’s, most of them expectedly objecting to 
his conclusion. Flanagan and Polger (1995) argued that zombies might 
wonder, just as conscious humans, whether qualia are inverted:
Suppose that normal zombies, upon seeing light of a certain wavelength x go
into a state that is the disposition to say, “that object is green”, and then they 
    
act on that disposition. […] All that is necessary for an inverted color 
judgment problem is that behavioral pathways get crossed twice. In our case 
(i.e., the usual inverted spectrum problem) one of the pathways is supposed 
to be the qualitative look of color, and the other a speech act. Zombies could 
have an equivalent problem with two non-conscious inversions […]. First, 
when seeing an object that reflects a wavelength x, the inverted color 
judgment zombie enters the state that, in normal zombies, is the disposition 
to say, “that object is red.” However, due to the second crossed wire, the 
inverted color judgment zombie’s “that object is red” state actually causes it 
to utter, “that object is green.” Thus a double inversion can create a problem 
indistinguishable from the inverted spectrum problem.
This primitive version of the Bafflement=Misperception Equation 
can be straightforwardly refuted: Just uncross the damn wires! Then let the 
zombies inspect their brains to see that no wires are crossed anymore, 
and they will stop worrying about inverted qualia for good. Now, do 
Flanagan and Polger believe that we humans have a similar cross-wiring? 
In this case neurophysiology is on its way to one of its greatest 
discoveries, and the Mind-Body Problem will shortly find its solution. I 
will not blame you, dear order, if you are not willing to bet on this 
possibility. 
Dennett’s (1995) attack on Moody was sharper, launched at the 
logical level: 
If, ex hypothesi, zombies are behaviorally indistinguishable from us normal 
folk, then they are really behaviorally indistinguishable! They say just what we 
say, they understand what they say (or, not to beg any questions, they 
understandz what they say), they believez what we believe, right down to 
having beliefsz that perfectly mirror all our beliefs about inverted spectra, 
"qualia," and every other possible topic of human reflection and conversation (p. 322, 
italics original).10
Dennett correctly points out a flaw in Moody’s formulation of the 
problem (see the two definitions for a zombie in section 10 above), but 
he still misses the essential point. Moody’s question can be easily re-
phrased so as to be immune to Dennett’s criticism: 
“Suppose that there are zombies that behave just as we do yet lack 
qualia. Would their bafflement about qualia be consistent with physical 
laws?”
Thus rephrased, the question has two possible answers, each of 
which having far-reaching consequences:
a. Zombies will be baffled over qualia by virtue of some physical cause. 
In this case, bafflement about qualia is not due to the existence of qualia. But 
then, another cause for this allegedly erroneous bafflement must be 
    
detected by future neurophysiology, which will indicate that we some-
how misperceive our percepts. This is the result obliged by physicalism.
b. Zombies will not be baffled over qualia. Dualism would then be vindi-
cated. 
12. The Asymmetry Proof: Genuine Bafflement Has No Physical 
Cause
Thankfully, we do not need zombies to exist in order to give the cardinal 
question about zombie bafflement a definite answer. We are now in a 
position to prove that all the physicalist counter-arguments to the 
Bafflement Argument, such as the Bafflement–Misperception Equation, 
run into contradiction. Let us take Chalmers’ argument as a 
representative example. Recall that by physicalism, the laws of 
perception are, in essence, physical laws too. Here, then, is the proof: 
1.A presumably conscious human (henceforth Chalmers) states that his 
percept P is not identical with the corresponding quale Q. 
2.Chalmers further argues that a zombie duplicate of him (henceforth 
Charmless) is possible, who has only P without Q. 
3.Chalmers asserts that, by physical law, Charmless must notice a 
difference between what he knows about the physical process 
underlying his percept and the unmediated percept itself.
4.Chalmers then argues that this difference (3) must produce in Charm-
less the same bafflement as Chalmers’ bafflement about the P-Q 
nonidentity (1). 
5.Ask now Chalmers: Can you conceive of a Charmless who is identical 
to you but lack Q? His answer, by (2), is “Yes.”
6.Next ask Charmless: Can you conceive of a duplicate of you (hence-
forth Harmless) who is identical to you but lacks Q? His answer, by 
(3), must be “No; unmediated percepts must occur by physical law.”
7.As Chalmers can conceive of Charmless but Charmless cannot con-
ceive of Harmless11, the two kinds of bafflement, associated with (1) 
and (3), are essentially different. 
8.Hence, the physical explanation for (3) does not hold for (1). 
9.Hence, (4) is false.
The same contradiction can be shown to follow any theory that 
denies causal role to qualia. Let me reiterate the reasoning presented in 
this paper’s Introduction: Why do we perceive qualia as distinct from 
    
our neural firings? If it is not because they are different, then we have a 
misperception of them as different. But misperception, just like perception, may or 
may not have an accompanying quale. Take a simple optical illusion, say, a 
straight line appearing to be curved. Both the correct and the incorrect 
percepts may or may not have a quale. Now, the optical illusion is 
obliged by the laws of perception, whereas qualia are not! 
Generalizing, we get the Asymmetry Proof: 
If a quale is identical with its percept, then its appearance as nonidentical must be 
due to misperception. But misperception, being a special kind of perception, occurs in 
accordance with physical law. Hence, upon reflection, it must turn out to be obligatory. 
Qualia, in contrast, can be conceived of as altogether absent.
13. A Welcome Consequence: Qualia Make Evolutionary Sense 
Before concluding, let us appreciate one of the Bafflement Argument’s 
scientific benefits, which for upholders of the Qualia Inaction Postulate 
is unattainable. 
If Alice kisses Bob only by virtue of neural mechanisms developed 
during evolution, whence the quale of loving? The question is well 
known in the broader biological context. If a rabbit escapes a fox only 
by virtue of neural mechanisms, and if the fox chases it unaffected by 
the quale of hunger, why are there qualia of fear and hunger in the first 
place? 
In his famous “What is it like to be a bat?” Nagel (1974) has extended 
the question of qualia to animals, whose expressions of emotions seem 
to indicate that they have qualia too. What qualia – if any – has a bat 
when perceiving something with the aid of echolocation? An eminent 
zoologist and pioneer of bat echolocation research, Donald Griffin, 
responded to Nagel’s challenge with some fascinating books (e.g., 1992) 
claiming to prove animal consciousness. However, most philosophers, 
even those sympathetic to this goal, pointed out that Griffin ignored the 
more serious “problem of other minds” (see section 1): There is no 
proof yet for the so natural assumption that other humans have 
consciousness!
Once, however, bafflement indicates the ability of qualia to affect 
behavior, then the question gets a very reasonable answer. Alice’s kiss 
may take a bit longer thanks to the additional effect of love’s quale , and 
the qualia of hunger and fear may add some speed to the rabbit’s and the 
fox’s race. Evolution is capable of magnifying even the minutest effects 
(Elitzur, 1994). Qualia, therefore, may give a real advantage for survival.
    
14. The Penalty: Conversation Laws Might Be Wrong
While interactionist dualism makes evolutionary sense, its clash with 
conservation laws, so fundamental to physics, is an unavoidable price,
and a heavy one. All I can say in reply is that as far as the reasoning in 
this article was sound, no consequence should be feared. In addition, let 
me point out that physics itself is beset by several paradoxes that 
indicate a future revolution. Basic notions like space, time and causality 
must be thoroughly revised in order to resolve some of modern physics’ 
longstanding paradoxes (Elitzur et al., 2005). 
15. Facing the Inescapable: The Physical Explanation of Behavior 
is Incomplete 
At the end of the day, it is astonishing that, throughout the enormous 
literature on the Mind-Body Problem, nearly no attention has been given 
to the so simple question: Why are people baffled over the Mind-Body 
Problem? 
I submit that there are only two consistent answers. Either 
a. People are baffled over the Mind-Body Problem because the prob-
lem is genuine, i.e., qualia are not identical with percepts. Ergo, it is 
qualia’s very existence that gives rise to the behaviors associated with 
bafflement. Ergo, something non-physical interferes with physical 
processes;
Or
b. People are baffled over the Mind-Body Problem for erroneous rea-
sons. Qualia are identical with the percepts. Ergo, the physical causes 
for the misperception of qualia will eventually be found, explaining 
once and for all the widespread failure to accept the percepts-qualia 
identity. 
Answer (b), I submit, has been shown in this article to be flawed. 
Then there is a chimera of (a) and (b), endorsed by Chalmers (1996) 
and Flanagan and Polger (1995): 
c. People are baffled over the Mind-Body Problem, and the problem is 
genuine, i.e., qualia are not identical with the percepts. However, 
people are baffled by this nonidentity for reasons other than this 
nonidentity. 
Allow me to formulate (c) in common language: 
“I have qualia, but I would have said that I had qualia even if I had 
not. Still, I have qualia. Believe me, I do!”
    
I must confess that have I heard such a statement from a person in 
the street I would suspect that he is schizophrenic or at least severely 
schizoid. That such a position is endorsed by competent philosophers 
only attests to the acuity of the cardinal yet neglected question as to why 
people are baffled by qualia. Dualism, alas, offers the most reasonable 
answer.
Notes 
1. Previously known as “materialism.”
2. This is in essence Jackson’s “knowledge argument,” forcefully presented in his 
paper “What Mary Didn't Know” (1986), which gave rise to an entire volume titled 
There's Something About Mary (Ludlow et al., 2004).
3. Facilitated – how inventive is evolution! – by rhodopsin, the same pigments 
facilitating color vision in our eyes.
4. I am indebted to Uzi Awret for the following keen observation: “While the easy 
problem of consciousness is a result of knowing too little, the hard problem results 
from knowing too much.”
5. A more accurate dichotomy will be the contrast between physicalism (“the 
physical world is everything; mind is an illusion”) and mentalism (“everything is 
mind; matter is an illusion”). Conversely, one may distinguish between monism 
(“there is only one reality, namely, the physical/mental”) with dualism (“there are 
two realities, the physical and the mental”). But for our purpose the above 
dichotomy suffices.
6. Kim (1996) refers to this postulate as the “exclusion argument,” and Flanagan 
(1997) as “conscious inessentialism.”
7. A possible objection to this prediction can argue that a false belief can exist in 
one’s brain while its causes, namely, the previous events that have lead to this belief, 
no longer exist in that person’s memory. However, the experience of both 
psychodynamic and cognitive therapy shows that this is not so. The causation of 
false belief seems to be accessible to the therapist, albeit with considerable effort, 
their elucidation leading to the removal of that false belief. Neurophysiology will 
therefore follow suit.
8. Chalmers distinguishes between a psychological zombie and a phenomenal one. 
The zombie known from voodoo horror stories (or from the common derogatory 
term) is a psychological zombie, manifesting a clear behavior of a “living dead” such 
as apathy and lack of emotions. The zombie with which we deal, in contrast, is a 
    
phenomenal zombie, capable of manifesting all emotions manifested by humans, 
while only lacking the respective qualia.
9. And to make the irony perfect, it is Chalmers who has added a mischievous 
comment in his book (p. 190) wondering whether the staunch physicalist Dennett is 
a zombie!
10. The superscript z denotes, following Chalmers, zombie mental functions that 
resemble ours but lack qualia.
11. Which is why we need not worry about Armless and so on.
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